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Introduction
Against the background of demographic change and potential skills shortages, the employment of older workers becomes an increasingly important subject. Job exit of older workers occurs early on exit routes such as unemployment (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2010) , disability pensions (Autor and Duggan, 2003) , and early retirement (Blau, 1994; Börsch-Supan, 2000) . In the OECD countries, the average retirement age is currently 62 (OECD, 2009 ). While many firms have actively promoted early retirement in the past, there has been an increasing awareness that firms are reliant on their existing workforces in recent years. Therefore, many firms are developing strategies to preserve the potential of older employees and to induce them to stay longer in their jobs . Given low job mobility of older workers (Chan and Stevens, 2001; Ichino et al., 2007) , enhanced employment duration of old workers often implies that they transit to retirement later.
The advantages of employing older as opposed to younger workers consist in the greater work experience and on average higher firm-specific human capital of older workers, their personal reliability and loyalty to the firm, and their lower risk of quitting the job. Potential disadvantages are declining physical and cognitive skills, human capital obsolescence and relatively low flexibility and mobility (Skirbekk, 2008) . In order to deal with the specific requirements of older workers, firms apply a variety of different human resources policies specifically targeted at this group. These policies typically entail the age-specific equipment of workplaces, reduced working time, reduced work intensity, reorganisation, health or training measures. We refer to these human resources measures as specific measures for older employees (SMOE).
While these measures are often described as suitable instruments to deal with performance-related consequences of an ageing workforce (Avolio et al., 1990) , to our knowledge, there no evidence on the relationship between SMOE and employment duration. In this paper, we are interested in the question of whether SMOE are associated with longer employment duration of older workers in the establishments. In order to assess this relationship, we estimate job exit rates for employees between the ages of 40 and 65. For our analysis, we use large longitudinal employer-employee data for Germany 1 that combine register data on employees with survey data on establishments. In the data, we observe the existence of SMOE at the establishment level and employment spells of individual employees. The data contain information on the application of the following specific measures for old employees: age-specific part-time work, age-specific equipment of workplaces, reduced work requirements, mixed-age work teams, standard training that is also offered to older employees, and specific training for older employees. In our sample, 50 percent of establishments 1 employing older workers apply at least one SMOE.
Many existing studies estimate the determinants of job or employment duration, but do not fully account for the fact that age is a time-varying variable. At best, theses studies include age at job entry or age at job exit among the regressors (Abowd et al., 2006; Boockmann and Steffes, 2010; Bronars and Famulari, 1997; Dohmen and Pfann, 2004; Mumford and Smith, 2004) . On the other hand, studies that focus on the job exit for old employees typically focus on the age at exit and neglect or restrict the time-varying nature of elapsed employment duration (e.g. Backes-Gellner and Veen, 2009) . Given our focus on older employees, a transition model for job exits should fully consider both duration dependence, i.e. how transitions out of employment vary with tenure, and age dependence, i.e. how transitions out of employment vary with age. Considering tenure, a 60-year-old employee who just started a new job differs substantially from another employee who has been in the current job for 30 years. On the other side, considering age, a 60-yearold employee is likely to have a higher risk of leaving employment than a 30-year-old if both have the same tenure. We disentangle the effects of age and duration by setting up a transition model with simultaneous consideration of duration and age dependence.
Essentially, this results in a transition model with time-varying age effects, where survival at any point in time depends on both the elapsed duration and the elapsed age of the worker. This approach was inspired by a study of Imbens (1994) , who models duration and calendar time effects simultaneously (see also van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2001; Dohmen and Pfann, 2004) . We are not aware that such a model has previously been used for the joint estimation of duration and age effects of old employees. Our transition model consists of parts for age dependence, for duration dependence, and a time-invariant explanatory part. The latter takes heterogeneity into account by exploiting a large set of covariates. Furthermore, the richness of the data allows for including establishment fixed effects. In this way, we consider the recent evidence of substantial heterogeneity between firms with respect to employment duration (e.g. Abowd et al., 2006) .
It is cumbersome to obtain representative samples of employment spells of older workers, who are typically characterised by their long employment histories. Using a sample of inflows into jobs can avoid length-bias and left-censoring in some situations. However, the group of employees starting a new job when they are old is highly selective. Moreover, workers starting their jobs at a younger age would have to be followed for a long period of time until they are observed to be considered "old" in the data. Instead of using an inflow sample, we therefore draw a stock sample of older workers employed at a particular date.
However, since long employment durations are over-represented in stock samples compared to short durations (Lancaster, 1990) , our estimator corrects for the stock sampling bias.
Our estimation results show that employment spells of older workers last longer in firms applying mixed-age work teams as a SMOE. By contrast, we find that employment durations in firms that participate in a part-time scheme directed at older workers shorten employment duration. Employment duration does not appear to be related to other SMOE, such as training and specific equipment of workplaces. While we do not claim that our results necessarily have a causal interpretation, our explorative study provides empirical evidence that certain SMOE are related to a change of employment duration of older workers while others are not. This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly review previous research on employment duration of older employees. In Section 3, we discuss specific human resources measures for older employees. Section 4 presents the empirical approach.
We introduce the data set in Section 5 and show estimation results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Employment of older workers
Ageing of the workforce is partly due to increasing employment-rates of older workers.
In Germany, employment-rates of workers aged 60 to 64 has risen from 33 percent to 53 percent between 2000 (Federal Employment Agency, 2011 .
There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of job exit among older workers and one branch of this literature is interested in retirement decisions and early retirement.
In our analysis, however, we are solely interested in the relationship between specific human resource measures and job exit. Since profit maximizing firms are more likely to focus on employment duration than on the fate of workers that leave the firm, our analysis focuses on employment duration , independent of the target state. Nevertheless, there is a close link between job exit of older workers and the transition to retirement, as both decisions often coincide. This is particularly true for countries such as Germany, where "bridge jobs" (Ruhm, 1990; Macunovich, 2009) are not frequently used in the job-stopping process. Even where bridge jobs exist, it has often been observed that older workers faced with choosing between the alternatives of retiring early or changing jobs in order to cut back in terms of working time or job requirements mostly choose the first option (Hurd, 1993; Abraham and Houseman, 2004) .
Early retirement decisions have been studied frequently, for instance in Börsch-Supan (2000) and Gruber and Wise (2004) . In this literature, sometimes structural models are derived, based on the assumption of voluntary retirement transitions; Blau (1994) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) . However, transitions out of employment cannot always be considered a voluntary decision of the employee, particularly in countries in which strong institutional rules exist for the transition to retirement.
The institutional setting may either be related to the company or to government regulations. In our study, we consider the companies' policies. A number of determinants have been singled out as institutional reasons for job exit of older workers. Blau and Shvydko (2011) estimate the impact of company characteristics and (a lack of) flexibility on the job separation probability. They suggest that a lack of part-time and flexible-hours work schemes as well as lack of training and promotion opportunities for older workers may 4 be responsible for the abrupt (and permanent) change from full time employment into complete retirement. Hurd and McGarry (1993) study the effects of job characteristics on retirement for US workers. Among job characteristics, they look at physical and mental requirements and job flexibility. They find that physical and mental job requirements only have little influence on prospective retirement. By contrast, employer policies and job flexibility have a large stabilizing effect on employment and delay the transition to retirement. Related to the subject of our paper, the study by Cottini et al. (2011) for Denmark addresses the question of whether voluntary turnover is influenced by adverse workplace conditions and human resources measures. In particular, they look at the influence of High-Involvement Work Practices on employee turnover. The authors define these practices as "a cluster of complementary human resources management practices designed to promote employee involvement" (p. 872). More precisely, they look at whether the worker has influence on decisions concerning his/her work, whether the worker is informed of the decisions affecting his/her workplace, and whether the worker has participated in courses or onthe-job-training at his/her present workplace. They find that the first of these variables indeed reduces the propensity to separate from the employer. Furthermore, they show that the positive impact of some adverse workplace conditions is mitigated by the use of High-Involvement Work Practices.
For Germany, there is evidence that employment duration of older employees is influenced by firm-specific characteristics (Wübbeke, 1999) . Moreover, the empirical personnel economics literature (Beckmann, 2007; Henseke and Tivig, 2008) suggests that firm characteristics and working conditions are important determinants of employment and re-employment after age 50.
Apart from adverse workplace conditions and employer measures to alleviate them, technological change and corresponding human resources policies may be related to job exit for old workers or retirement. Thus, Bartel and Sicherman (1993) find that unexpected technological change induces workers to retire earlier, and that training in industries with rapid technological change induces workers to retire later. In a similar vein, Schleife (2006) investigates the effect of computer use on employment of older workers. While it is reasonable to hypothesise that older workers using computers have successfully adjusted to technological change and are, therefore, more likely to retire later than other workers (see also Friedberg, 2003) , there is little empirical support for this proposition. As one example, Biagi et al. (2013) do find evidence that computer use prolongs employment among Italian men.
Finally, demand changes may affect older workers more strongly than younger workers, if firms adjust to changing demand by promoting early retirement. Consistent with this view, Gielen and van Ours (2006) find that older employees are more affected by firmspecific fluctuations than younger employees in the Netherlands.
In addition to workplace conditions or other determinants related to the firm, social security institutions create incentives for retirement by defining age criteria for eligibility to certain benefits. Rust and Phelan (1997) show that social security institutions shape the distribution of retirement. For instance, they show that eligibility of early retirements benefits at the age of 62 produce a spike in the retirement distribution. Such incentives are present in most social security systems, in particular in the pension system (Börsch-Supan, 2000; Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2004; Hakola and Uusitalo, 2005; Euwals et al., 2010; Coile and Levine, 2007) and the system of unemployment insurance (Dlugosz et al., 2009; Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2010) . As we only consider transitions out of employment in one particular year, 2002, our data cover a period with a stable institutional setting and we do not aim to investigate the effects of changes in institutional rules concerning retirement.
Specific human resources measures for older employees
Many firms implement specific human resources measures for older employees. These measures are based on the insight that generally older employees have different competencies and requirements than their younger colleagues (Boockmann and Zwick, 2004; Skirbekk, 2008) . In this section, we provide an overview of the following measures: specific equipment of workplaces, reduced work requirements, mixed-age work teams, standard training offered to older employees, specific training for older employees, and age specific parttime. These six measures were included as items in the 2002 wave of the survey part of the LIAB (compare Section 5 and Appendix). Figure 1 A specific equipment of workplaces is, for example, provided to compensate constraints in hearing or seeing capabilities of older employees (Harper and Marcus, 2006) .
Examples for constraints in capabilities are an increased illumination of the workplace, higher font size on screens, a higher contrast in signs, or protection from excessive environmental noise (Magrain and Boulton, 2007; Spirduso et al., 2005) . Implementation of specifically equipped workplaces for older employees is likely to be associated with prolonged employment duration. We suppose that there can be two effects of specifically equipped workplaces. First, older employees who work in an environment that satisfies their age-specific needs are more productive than without the measure. Göbel and Zwick (2010) support this hypothesis: application of specifically equipped workplaces is associated with higher productivity of workers aged 40 and above. Second, at an age-specific workplace, older employees feel more comfortable and are less likely to leave their job due to workplace-related reasons.
Workplaces with reduced work requirements allow participating employees to stay on their job until statutory retirement age is reached, but with a reduced work load.
Being offered reduced work requirements, an older employee is expected to stay longer in the establishment and we expect that this measure prolongs their employment duration.
Older employees are likely to stay in establishments that are willing and able to reduce the requirements if required.
Mixed-age work teams is another measure for the integration of older employees.
The idea is that older and younger employees have different strengths and weaknesses stemming from varying experience, perspectives, and social networks (Kearney et al., 2009 ). On the one hand, a mixture of different age groups can create cross-fertilisation of ideas, a transfer of knowledge and experience, and a combination of resources for all age groups since younger and older employees can concentrate on their comparative advantages (Backes-Gellner and Veen, 2009). On the other hand, compulsory mixing of age groups might be stressful for older employees. A job charged with stress is more likely to be quit by the employee. The study by Börsch-Supan and Weiss (2007) finds no age differences in productivity for workers of one assembly line at Daimler AG. Göbel and Zwick (2010) , in contrast, analyse a large data set for Germany and find that relative productivity increases for older and younger employees in establishments that apply mixed-age work teams. Given previous evidence, there is no strong expectation that mixed-age work teams lead to increasing employment duration of older workers.
Participation in Standard training declines with age (Ben-Porath, 1967; Becker, 1975; Fitzenberger and Mühler, 2011) . This can partly be explained by a lack of motivation of older employees in improving human capital (Warr and Fay, 2001) . At the same time, some establishments offer older employees access to their standard training programmes in order to deal with higher adaptability requirements of older workers in innovative firms or in firms investing in information and communication technology (Aubert et al., 2006) .
Controlling for self-selection into training, Picchio and van Ours (2012) find that firmprovided training increases employment of older workers aged 50 to 64.
Older employees might have different training needs than younger employees because of different motivations for training participation or different skills to be trained. Several firms offer specific training for older employees, which can meet their specific requirements. Provision of training should increase employment duration of older employees.
Age-specific training is likely to have even stronger effects on employment than standard
training. Yet, on the contrary, training for the elderly may yield opposite effects when employees feel that they are bound to participate in training courses. When participation creates stress and pressure, older employees are even more likely to quit earlier than in absence of the training courses. We separately analyse whether standard training or specific training are associated with a change of the employment duration of older workers. for an employee older than 55 who reduces work time to 50 percent or less (Brussig et al., 2009) . Comparable part-time schemes have been evaluated in Austria (Graf et al., 2011) , the UK (Gielen, 2009) , and Sweden (Wadensjö, 2006) . For Austria and the UK, the authors find that the programmes are not successful in prolonging work life of older employees, but that subsidisation costs are high. For Sweden, (Wadensjö, 2006) isolates a positive effect on labour supply of older employees. His finding is explained by the consideration that the incentive to work part-time instead of full-time is higher than the incentive to work part-time instead of retiring. By contrast, Charles and Decicca (2010) implicitly emphasise the importance of flexible work time for older employees because their labour supply preferences conflict with firms' hours constraints. Concerning the subsidised part-time scheme in Germany, Brussig et al. (2009) indicate that the measure is applied mostly as a pathway to early retirement. Given this evidence, our expectation is that the application of part-time-schemes for older employees shortens the employment duration of older employees, when they are used for early retirement. On the other hand parttime work could lead to longer employment duration if the measure is used to smooth the retirement process out.
Age

Estimation approach
We specify a model that allows identification of age-specific transition rates out of employment. The transition model to estimate duration and age effects can be written as
were θ(a|t, X) denotes the transition rate at age a, given employment duration t and covariates X. The transition rate θ is the product of three distinct terms: The baseline transition rate θ 0 (a), which is a function of age, a baseline duration part d 0 (t), which is a function of employment duration, and the explanatory part e(X). Basically equation 1 is a transition model where the key variables, age and employment duration are time-varying.
A similar specification has been applied by Imbens (1994) , who uses a likelihood framework to estimate duration and calendar time effects simultaneously. He also suggests that a similar specification could be useful to estimate duration and age effects simultaneously.
Specification of the likelihood contributions
In our data, the information on employment duration is available on a daily basis. This justifies the application of a duration model in continuous time.
For the age-specific transition rate, we specify a piecewise constant baseline θ 0 (a) = exp(a 1 ) for 0 < a ≤ a 1 , where a 1 is the age at the end of the first year of the employment spell. For further periods, θ 0 (a) = exp(a t ) for a t−1 < a ≤ a t for all t = 1, . . . , T , where a T denotes the age at the end of the employment spell.
Duration dependence d 0 (t) is specified as piecewise constant function in a similar way for t = 1, . . . , T , where t notes the elapsed employment duration since the start of the employment spell. The explanatory part e(X) is specified as exp(X β) where X denotes the covariates and β is the vector of corresponding parameters.
We specify the transition function in equation 1 over age 40 to 65, that has been considered in our sample. Employment durations are indexed from 1 to 6, where "6" denotes employment durations that last longer than six years. Employment durations of one year denote the reference:
The survival function, which provides the survival probabilities for a worker at age a given that he survived employment duration t and given the explanatory variables X comprises the integral over the transition function since the start of the employment spell:
In other words, the survival probabilities at age a depend on the development of the individual transition rates since the start of the employment spell, taking into account, that workers survive time-varying transition risks that depend as well on age as on elapsed employment duration. The likelihood function allows for exogenous right-censoring, e.g.
when employment continues after the end of the observation period. 2 The individual likelihood contribution (with c = 1 when the employment spell is right-censored and c = 0 otherwise) can be written as
Stock sampling
Within a framework for employment durations and job exits of older employees, sampling is particularly involved as employment durations can be very long. An employee who started an ongoing employment spell at age 21 has achieved an employment duration of 39 years at age 60. For older employees, flow sampling of employment spells is selective as employees who start a new job when they are old are a specifically selected group of the population of older employees. Moreover, since the data provides only information for a fixed observation period, with a flow sample we would only observe employment spells with a maximum duration equal to the length of this observation period. Since we are interested in the outcomes for all old employees, including long-lasting employment spells, we therefore draw a stock sample for our analysis. However, using stock-sampling, we have to correct for stock-sampling bias, as discussed in the following.
For our analysis we sample from the stock of workers that are employed at January 1st, 2002. It is well known, that stock sampling generates a bias, i.e. long employment spells are over-represented as compared to shorter employment spells (e.g. Lancaster, 1990; Berger and Black, 1998) . This affects the estimates of the duration dependence as well as the distribution of associated observables and unobservables in the sample. We did not find a discussion on the relationship between (stock) sampling and identification of ageeffects in the literature. However, both, the duration dependence as well as the age of the employee jointly determine the transition rate at a given age. Since duration dependence and age effects are interdependent, the consideration of stock-sampling bias, as discussed for standard duration models, is also relevant for the identification of age-effects.
For correcting the bias in our transition model, we follow Berger and Black (1998) and augment the individual contribution to the likelihood function by conditioning on the survival until a s , the age (and associated elapsed employment duration) of the worker at sampling date. For example, we multiply the individual likelihood contribution with the term 1 S(as−a 0 ) , where a 0 is the age at the start of the employment spell. 3 Consequently, S(a s − a 0 ) is the survival probability at employment duration (a s − a 0 ).
Given a transition function θ(a|t, X) that depends on age, duration and covariates, the survival rate can be written as S(a s − a 0 |t, X) = exp(−´a s a 0 θ(a|t, X) d a). Putting the sampling correction into the individual likelihood contribution for an observed transition at age a yields
so the part of the integral before stock sampling cancels out, in the case without unobserved heterogeneity (see also Bergemann and Mertens (2011) ). The individual likelihood contribution with this correction for stock sampling is
Considering stock-sampling, we also take into account, that the size of the time window, 
Data
We The total sample consists of 1,063 West German establishments. 7 We impose the restriction that a firm has to have at least five employees aged 40 to 65. This restriction is justified by computational reasons of estimations with establishment fixed effects. To the establishment data, information is linked on all workers between ages 40 and 65 employed by the establishments in 2002. The number of employees in our sample is 241,042. We are able to observe employees back to 1975. 8 Since some of the employment spells started before 1975, about 20 percent of observed employment spells are left-censored. We at-tribute a random job start for these workers, assuming a constant rate for employment start between the age of 20 and their age at January 1st, 1975.
The definition of employment duration in our study is as follows: employment duration or tenure is the time t a worker is employed by one establishment. The duration is the period from the start until the end of an employment relationship within a particular establishment. Similar to Boockmann and Steffes (2010) we allow the job to be interrupted by up to 92 days, which might be caused by seasonal employment or short periods of non-employment. We assume short interruptions to be a recall to the same employer.
Employment ends if either the worker has a transition into unemployment, a job with another establishment, non-employment, or if the current employer reports the end of the employment relationship to the social insurance institution (see Boockmann and Steffes, 2010 , who apply the same definition of employment).
In the 2002 LIAB questionnaire, establishments are asked about SMOE with respect to the six measures discussed in Section 3: reduced working time, specific equipment of workplaces, reduced work requirements, age-mixed teams, standard training offered to older employees, and specific training for older employees. Our empirical analysis is based on several sub-samples of older employees. Establishments are grouped according to application of SMOE. In this way, we obtain six groups of establishments that apply the respective measure and six different comparison groups that do not apply the respective measure. One should keep in mind that establishments that apply more than one SMOE appear in more than one sample.
In For computational reasons, all following estimations are based on a random draw of 300 establishments, which has a sample size of 59,099 worker observations.
Estimation results
In this section, we present results for the analysis of duration and age-effects for transition rates out of employment of older workers and their relation to the application of SMOE.
As described in Section 4, the dependence of job exit on age is modelled by a piecewise constant baseline hazard with annual intervals. We investigate the impact of SMOE on job exit for each year of age beyond 40, i.e. we cover 25 years, from age 40 to 65. Duration dependence is also specified as piecewise constant with annual intervals. 9
The graph on the left in Figure 2 shows the descriptive age profile of transition rates for employees aged 40 to 65, irrespectively of the use of SMOE by their employers. The profile is characterised by a strong increase in the transition rates as workers reach age 55.
For middle-aged employees between 40 and 54, there are little changes in the transition rates, with annual transition probabilities between 0.1 and 0.15. As expected, after age 55, the transition probably increases dramatically. There are particularly strong increases at ages 55, 60, 63, and 65. After age 65, i.e. regular pension age, only few transitions out of employment occur. This is why we refrain from calculating transition rates above age 65.
In the graph on the right in Figure 2 , descriptive transition rates show transition rates according to years of tenure (i.e. duration dependence). The tenure profile shows a familiar pattern (compare, e.g., Boockmann and Steffes, 2010) ; immediately after the start of a new employment spell, transition rates out of employment are very high. With increasing job duration, the risk of job exit decreases substantially and remains roughly constant after five years (with the exception of a small spike at seven years duration).
Therefore, we use dummy variables for each year of tenure from one to five years of tenure and a further dummy for all durations beyond five years in our estimations. Both age and duration profiles shown here are corrected for the bias induced by stock sampling.
In the estimations of the hazard rate model, the age profiles are interacted with each of our six different SMOE. Thus, the impact of SMOE on job exit is estimated as the difference in the age effect on transitions between workers in establishments using a specific type of SMOE and workers in the establishments not applying the SMOE. Note that we have to normalise the difference at a particular age when using firm-level fixed effects because the fixed effect absorbs the effect of the SMOE. We choose to normalise the difference at age 40, thereby assuming that SMOE do not influence transition probabilities at that age. We will discuss the plausibility of this assumption after presenting the results further below.
We estimate three different specifications for the explanatory part in equation 1. Our preferred specification includes employee characteristics and establishment-level fixed effects. This specification is the least restrictive of our models since it allows for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity at the firm level. Employee characteristics are gender, nationality, daily wage (mean set to zero), formal education, job position, and type of occupation.
The second specification includes establishment-level covariates from the survey instead of establishment fixed effects. These estimates are instructive for an analysis of the relationship between establishment characteristics and the transitions out of employment for older workers. In this specification, we include firm size, skill structure, legal form, type of wage bargaining, works council, and the shares of female and older workers. In addition, we estimate a third specification without any covariates or fixed effects. In the following, we present our fixed-effects estimation results and discuss their differences to the other two estimators; results for these other estimators are contained in the internet appendix. 10
The estimated age profiles for establishments with and without SMOE are shown in Figures 3 to 8. For reduced work requirements, the estimated age profiles can be found in Figure 3 . Reduced work requirements do not influence employment duration of older workers; there are no significant differences between establishments applying or not applying this measure for any of the age groups between 41 and 65. From the results for the other two specifications, we find significantly lower exit rates in establishments using reduced work requirements only for a small number of age groups. Unexpectedly, there is also a positive effect at age 55 in the model with establishment variables. All in all, the effects are either insignificant or appear to be unsystematic.
Transition profiles for mixed-age work teams are displayed in Figure 4 . This measure seems to reduce transition rates of older workers substantially in most of the age groups. Even at ages 45 and 52, transition rates are significantly lower in establishments using mixed-age work teams. Starting at age 55, the differences in transition rates are quite large in magnitude and are further increasing with age. The fact that an impact appears to be present even at relatively low age could guard against the normalisation of age profiles at age 40. However, the differences from age 55 to 65 would remain substantial even if the normalisation were done with respect to any other age group from age 40 to 50.
Therefore, it appears that the application of mixed-age work teams are associated with prolong employment spells of older workers.
In Figure 5 , we show the transition profiles of those establishments that do and those 10 The internet appendix can be downloaded here:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zewdocs/div/DP12_059_paper_age_duration_appendix.pdf .
that do not offer age-specific part-time. Several variants of this part-time scheme exist.
The "block model", according to which the employee works full-time during the first half of the scheme and then reduces working time by 100% for the second half, is the most frequent one. Even if the worker is effectively retired in the second half of the scheme, he or she counts as being employed in our data. If there is substitution between agespecific part-time and other means of early retirement, we would expect the presence of the scheme to prolong (nominal) employment durations. In the case, unlike in the "block model", in which the employee actually chooses to work part-time during the scheme, employment duration could also be increased if this helps older workers reconcile work and leisure. The results, however, suggest that the application of age-specific part-time tends to reduce employment duration. However, the difference is only significant at ages 58 and 63. The results of the other two models suggest that the measure is related to longer employment duration of "younger older workers" aged below 55. This could be explained by the additional benefit that participation in the scheme conveys to workers, which could induce them to separate from these establishments later. In our preferred fixed-effect specification, however, the effect on workers below 55 is not present. Figures 6 and 7 show the age profile for age-specific training and standard training, respectively. In both cases, we expect the measures to decrease transition rates. By giving older workers access to training programmes, the employer's interest in keeping these workers in employment increases. However, the figures show that training does not relate to transition rates out of employment. Exit rates have the same magnitudes irrespective of whether training is provided. The differences are never statistically significant.
In the models without covariates and with firm-level variables instead of fixed effects, we do find significantly negative effects of standard training (but not of age-specific training) on transition rates at ages 45 to 55. Since the effect vanishes with the inclusion of establishment fixed effects, it is probably due to unobserved heterogeneity at the establishment level correlated both with training and the transition rate.
Finally, the transition profile of establishments that apply specific equipment of workplaces is contained in Figure 8 . Although older workers' transition rates out of their jobs appear to be lower in establishments with specifically equipped workplaces, these differences are never statistically significant. We conclude that the use of specific equipment of workplaces is not used as a means to increasing older workers' employment duration.
We briefly comment on the influence of worker and establishment characteristics on the exit rates of older workers from their jobs (see Table 2 ). Among the individual characteristics, women tend to have lower exit rates than men. As expected, a higher wage reduces transitions. Perhaps surprisingly, white-collar employment is associated with higher exit rates; this could be due to a more frequent use of early retirement in these occupations.
The use of age-specific part-time increases the exit rate; this is consistent with the estimated effect of this measure at the establishment level. There is little systematic influence of education, which is plausible for the group of older workers. The effects do not differ much between the models with and without fixed effects.
Among establishment characteristics, works councils and the use of ICT reduce transitions in our estimations; this is also found in other studies for employment durations of younger workers (see, e.g., Boockmann and Steffes, 2010) . The effect of workforce composition and company size are not strong. The same is true for the application of collective agreements.
Conclusion
Many German firms apply specific human resources measures for older employees (SMOE).
These measures cover different aspects, such as the equipment of workspaces, working time and intensity of work, mixed-age work teams and training. In this paper, we have investigated the difference of older workers' exit rates from their jobs according to the use of SMOE by their establishments. We apply a flexible specification to distinguish effects at different ages, controlling for duration dependence and correcting for stock-sampling.
We show that, among the SMOE considered, only aged-mixed teams are positively related to employment duration of older employees: transitions out of employment are lower in firms that apply this SMOE. For other measures, such as training, reduced work requirements and specific equipment, we do not find a similar relation to employment duration. Age-specific part-time is related to shorter employment durations of older workers. This result may be surprising because the measure is intended as a means to increase working time flexibility and provide a better work-life balance for older workers. Yet, the result is in line with descriptive information from the literature on the use of age-specific part-time as a means of early retirement.
The effect of mixed-age work teams complements existing evidence on the relationship between productivity and the application of SMOE (Göbel and Zwick, 2010) . Our analysis could be extended in future research to differentiate the effect with respect to different sectors or occupations. Backes-Gellner and Veen (2009) show that mixed-age work teams have positive productivity effects for workers only in non-routine occupations. It would be interesting to see whether this result transfers to employment durations.
The ineffectiveness of the other measures could be explained by a variety or reasons, such as limited resources provided for training and the re-design of workplaces and other difficulties of implementation. In any case, it needs to be stressed that, although we condition on a plethora of worker-level information and time-constant unobserved heterogeneity at the establishment level, our effects are not necessarily causal. To derive causal effects, one would need better data, e.g. detailed information on SMOE at the level of the worker.
However, high-quality worker-level data including information on participation in SMOE are currently not available.
All in all, it appears that the search for suitable instruments of human resources management to tackle demographic change and to better exploit the potential of older workers must go on. Despite the importance of this subject, there have been only very few quantitative studies that have addressed this topic. More research is required before definite conclusions as to "what works in age management" can be drawn. 
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